

tura; fatto analogo è riscontrabile a Gigantija dove l'altezza delle pareti delle celle raggiunge i cinque metri.

In concordanza con i modellini di templi da Hagar Qim e Hal Saflieni, si deve dunque ammettere che gli edifici templari erano concepiti come aggregati di spazi a cielo scoperto e che solo eccezionalmente, forse in relazione a particolari esigenze, qualche ambiente poteva essere fornito di copertura.

Gli architetti che costruirono templi di tali dimensioni e perfezione tecnica erano sicuramente in grado di risolvere qualsiasi problema di copertura; se questa manca, le ragioni devono essere legate all'origine stessa del tempio, alla sua primitiva tipologia ed al conseguente conservatorismo religioso.

Un tipo di costruzione, formata da piccoli recinti a pianta ellittica raccolti intorno ad un cortile centrale, sembrerebbe essere tra i più antichi luoghi di culto, se non il più antico in senso assoluto. L'esempio migliore è quello di Borg ta l'Mramma¹⁰ ma non mancano altri casi come ad esempio Kordin. Che la pianta di Borg ta l'Mramma abbia una profonda vitalità è attestato dal persistere dello stesso schema nel tempio di Hagar Qim (parte occidentale) dove esso coesiste con il tipo già classico della coppia di celle simmetriche.

La risposta definitiva a questi problemi può venire solo da nuovi scavi condotti nei siti megalitici minori che, seppure modesti, possono in realtà apportare un notevole contributo alle nostre conoscenze sulla grande civiltà preistorica di Malta.

¹⁰ A. Mayr, op.cit., p. 48-50

T. Ashby, op.cit., p. 4

T. Zammit, *The Prehistoric Remains of the Maltese Islands*, in *Antiquity IV* (1930), p. 63.

J. Evans, op.cit. (1971), pp. 171-172.

La fotografia n. 1 è stata eseguita dal Sg. J. Theuma.

Le fotografie di cui alle figure n. 2-5 sono dovute alla cortesia del Direttore del Museo Nazionale, Valletta.

WAR AND POWER

By JOHN MICALLEF

1. THE NATURE OF POWER

Relations between man and man are determined by the fact that all men are equal before the law, that is, they have all the rights which the constitution grants to all adult human beings, such as the right to bear arms, the right to worship and so on. Such rights and the application of the law on every occasion on which these rights are questioned or denied give rise to the administration of justice as the basis for human relations.

Such a basis of human relations can be expressed in the formula: *what is mine is mine, and what is yours is yours* — in relation to property; or in the formula: *I do what I like and you do what you like* — in relation to freedom; or more directly in relation to human relations: *Don't bug me and I won't bug you*.

Rarely, however, are human relations based on such a strict notion of justice; even more rarely are they based on a sharing in love which might be expressed in the formula: *What is mine is yours and what is yours is mine* — in relation to property, or in the formula: *I do what you like, and you'll do what you like* — in relation to freedom, or directly in relation to human relations: *I won't bug you, but you may bug me*.

More often than not human relations between man and man are based on interest rather than justice, for men are not satisfied with the rights that the law grants; they try to usurp for themselves such rights as they can get hold of at the expense of others without giving up any of their own rights. Thus, they end up with a distorted view of justice which might be expressed in the formula: *What is mine is mine, and what is yours is mine* — in relation to property, or in the formula: *I do what I like, but you do what I like* — in relation to freedom; or more directly in relation to all human relations: *Don't bug me, but I may bug you*.

Similarly, relations between nations are based occasionally on justice, rarely on love, but more often than not on interest, which gives rise to power. Power is exercised by one man or a group of men over another man or a group of men through the control of the mind and their actions.

On the other hand, political power should be distinguished from force or violence, which is usually military or pseudo-military action. The threat of the use of such force, however, is political. Thus, to threaten to attack a nation is a political action, but to attack it is a military operation.

The threat works on the threatened nation and establishes a psychological rapport with the minds of the opponents; if and when the threat gives way to attack, then the opponents cease to relate to each other. Instead of trying to establish a reconciliation, they try, or become interested in trying, to destroy each other.

Thus, the objective of political power in whatever way it is manifested or exercised, even if it is simply limited to the knowledge of military preparations and the extent of its weapons and armaments, rather than the threat of their use, is to control another nation or group of nations into submission. The stronger nation, even without actually acting aggressively, may attempt to scare away the other nations from the use of military force by making them realize that their attack, or even their defense, would be both futile and dangerous, since it would easily risk incurring more punishment than they could ever expect to inflict. Thus, the 'exhibition' of military armaments and/or the threat of their use is a manifestation of political power and is intended to make the actual use of such force or military power by the enemy both useless and unnecessary.

All political action, therefore, rules out any action which does not refer to power; so political power is limited to 'the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large.' Morgenthau p. 26.

In its more rigid application to international politics, however, political power should refer to the control of one nation by another. 'On the international scene I should define power as the capacity of a political unit to impose its will upon other units.' Aron. p. 47.

Political power is, therefore, a rapport between those in control and those under control, or between the aggressor and those opponents that he wishes or wants to bring under control through the influence exerted over their minds. Political power is, in short, a relation between the dominating and the dominated.

Such a relation establishes an influence based either on the expectation of advantages, or the fear of disadvantages, and it may be exercised through orders, threats, diplomacy, persuasion, authority, prestige, or even charismatic personality.

This exercise of power may be directed to the achievement of secondary goals, such as freedom, security, or prosperity; but any secondary goal is bound to lead to an increase and a strengthening of the primary goal, namely power itself. 'Whatever the material objective of a foreign policy, such as the acquisition of sources of raw materials, the controls of sea lanes, or territorial changes, they always entail control of the ac-

tions of others through influence over their minds.' Morgenthau p. 28.

If, therefore, international politics is a struggle for power, any action which does not tend to increase or decrease such power should not be considered a political action, but rather legal, economic, humanitarian or cultural activity. For example, an extradition treaty or a project for the promotion of a national culture in another country would entail legal or cultural involvement, but would not amount to a political action.

On the other hand, any action undertaken by a state in its relation with another state becomes political when it is used or directed as an instrument of a political policy, even if the action as such is economic, legal or cultural in itself, provided its political implication is greater than its significance in any other field of reference. For example, the imposition of economic sanctions on Italy when Mussolini attacked Ethiopia in 1935, was not an economic action, for it was meant to exercise political power over Italy's foreign policy, not over her commerce.

Such actions, therefore, should be examined and evaluated insofar as they contribute to the exercise and growth of the power of one state over another. For example, a loan given to an under-developed country may be a financial risk, but still worthwhile as a political maneuver to clinch an alliance; or again, a loan backed by financial security may turn out to be a political risk. In both cases, the political overtones of the transaction are more significant than the economic undertones.

Thus, to conclude this section, nations relate to each other almost always on the basis of interest, for all states are only interested in keeping and increasing their power. They may, in fact, tend to respect each other's territorial rights and privileges, but often they try to grab a slice of a neighbor's territory to open up a passage to the sea, or to protect a minority group or to weaken the power of a dangerous neighbor. Indeed, rarely, very very rarely or almost never, do nations give donations in goods or money, as the U.S. did with its Marshall plan, and even when they do, they rarely do it out of a spirit of love.

Thus, for the purpose of this analysis of power, we may ignore both love and justice as the basis of human relations, and consider interest as the paramount and pervasive basis. So, as relations between man and man justify killing for self-defense, so nations have assumed the right to destroy those nations that are trying to destroy them.

The life of governments is like that of man. The latter has a right to kill in case of natural defense; the former have a right to wage war for their own preservation. In the case of natural defense I have a right to kill, because my life in respect to me, what the life of my antagonist is

to him; in the same manner a state wages war, because its preservation is like that of any other being. With individuals the right of natural defense does not imply a necessity of attacking... But with states the right of natural defense carries along with it sometimes the necessity of attacking. ... The right therefore of war is derived from necessity and strict justice.' Montesquieu.

2. MANIFESTATION OF POWER

The interest of the nation comprises three positive and three negative factors:

(a) positive factors:

- (i) the people or citizens as members of the nation.
- (ii) the institutions for the administration of justice, the legislative bodies, executive government, police, education and so on.
- (iii) the nation itself, not merely insofar as it comprises the individual members and its institutions, but insofar as it constitutes a sovereign unit.

(b) negative factors:

the same three factors as outlined above in relation to other nations, usually rivals or opponents in power politics.

In ensuring the interest in these three factors relating to itself as a nation, the nation is directly enhancing its own interest; while in non-ensuring the interest of the three factors relating to other nations, the nation is indirectly enhancing its own interest.

Again, in safeguarding these three factors, the nation is asserting its identity as a nation, while in asserting its identity at the expense of that of other nations, it is asserting its power both over that other nation whose identity it is weakening or disrupting, and in itself as a sovereign unit.

Thus, power establishes and maintains the control of one nation or a group of nations. Such power is exercised through the control of the above three factors:

- (i) by imprisonment, enslavement or execution of its citizens.
- (ii) by abolishing or limiting the power of its institutions.
- (iii) by taking away the sovereignty of the nation either by incorporating it as a province or a 'department' of the conquering nation, like Northern Ireland, or by making it into a colony, as India was until 1948.

When one nation tries to dominate another nation, two possible courses of action are possible:

- (i) the stronger nation dominates the weaker one.
- (ii) if neither nation is willing to admit that it is the weaker one, both the attacking and the attacked nation try to prove that each of them is the stronger. Such an attempt brings about a state of war between the two nations.

War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and State, and individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, not even as citizens, but as soldiers; not as members of their country, but as its defenders. Finally, each State can have as enemies only other States.' Rousseau.

More simply, therefore war is 'armed conflict between political units' (Aron p. 326), not simply 'an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will' (Clausewitz I, 1 p. 2), because war takes place between sovereign states, or at least a sovereign state and a faction that is attempting to acquire or seize sovereignty, as in a civil war.

A state of war between two nations involves several implications both for the attacking and for the attacked nation; in fact both nations:

- (i) put the lives of their citizens in jeopardy.
- (ii) risk the breakdown of their institutions through the disorder brought about by the state of war and the resultant peace treaty.
- (iii) one nation disrupts the sovereignty of the other.

Obviously, the aggressive nation is acting against justice in attacking another nation, and is putting in jeopardy its very existence; so the issues to be raised are:

- (i) whether the attacking nation has the right to increase or at least safeguard its power by attacking another nation; and
- (ii) whether the attacked nation has the right to safeguard its own power by destroying the attacking nation.

Such an attack on either side entails the destruction of the citizens, the institutions and the sovereignty of the nation; on the other hand, a refusal to attack may equally entail the destruction of the citizens, the institutions and the sovereignty of the threatened nation through the attack or simply the hegemony of its rival opponent.

A State which is not prepared to defend itself by force of arms might just as well hand itself over to a more virile State, which, as a conqueror, does not hesitate to use these violent methods. To deny, on

ethical grounds, this elementary right of the state to defend itself by war simply means to deny the existence of the State itself. Brunner. p. 469.

These issues are further complicated because usually a nation does not safeguard the lives of its citizens, its institutions and its sovereignty in that order; but on the contrary in the reverse order. Ironically, quite often it can only safeguard its sovereignty and its institutions at the expense of the life of its citizens.

This analysis should therefore present three sets of questions to be clarified:

- (i) whether the attacking nation has the right to increase its power at the expense of another nation, and in that process destroy the life of the citizens and disrupt the institutions and sovereignty of the attacked nation.
- (ii) whether the attacked nation has the right to withstand an attack to save the lives of its citizens, and keep its institutions and its sovereignty.
- (iii) whether both the attacking and the attacked nation can increase or safeguard their institutions and their sovereignty at the expense of the life of their citizens.

The first issue is one of fact rather than of right, and will be examined in the later analysis of the restriction of power. Spinoza, however, seems to think that any nation has the right to attack another nation: 'If, therefore, one commonwealth wishes to attack another and to use extreme measures in order to make it subject, it has the right to attempt this, since *all it needs to wage war by right is the will to wage war.*' *Tractatus Politicus III, 3.* (italics mine)

The second issue is one of right rather than fact and is based on the principle of self-defense, which cancels all previous rights to loyalty and protection; for, as Locke points out, 'to resist force with force, being the state of war that levels all parties, cancels all former relation of reverence, respect, and superiority.' *Treatise of Civil Government, paragraph 235.*

Though this second issue is based on the right of each nation to safeguard its identity as a nation, since war demands fighting and fighting entails killing, then it merges or overlaps with the issue under point three, namely, whether any nation should safeguard its identity and its sovereignty at the expense of the lives of its citizens, or to put it more directly, whether the state is for the individual or the individual is for the state.

Though it is practically taken for granted that man is, at least in principle, more significant or important than property, and by extension man is more important than the land, it does not follow that man as man should be given a chance to survive, when the nation as a nation is in danger of perishing, because while man is expendable, the nation is not. However, this principle is not as obvious as it may seem, for in considering whether man is expandable, we have to clarify whether we are referring to the total population of the nation or to a minority; and further whether we are referring to a partial territory or the legal and political identity of the nation.

If we refer to a minority of the population of the nation, we may admit that such a minority like any individual is expendable because one minority, like any group of individuals does not make nor break the political identity, much less the sovereignty, of the nation. In fact, while one man can be replaced by another man, the nation cannot be replaced by another nation.

This judgment seems harsh when we put it against the basic fact that man is the most significant single creature in existence, but when man as an individual joins with other men and forms a state, he becomes a political human being. He can persist as a political man only by continuing to form part of the state, and he can only form part of the state, as long as the state persists in existence.

Moreover, any group of men who are thus willing or forced to sacrifice their life for the safeguarding of the lives of the majority of the citizens, for the institutions and the sovereignty of the state are thus sacrificing their life not only to fulfill their identity as political human beings, but to ensure that the majority of the citizens of the nations go on existing as political human beings by safeguarding the existence of the state itself.

If, however, the total population of a nation is putting its life in jeopardy by resisting an aggressive nation, such resistance would be futile, and it would prove wiser to offer a limited resistance, or even a token opposition, to preserve one's honor and integrity, as in fact Belgium and Holland did when they were attacked by Hitler's army, even though such limited resistance entailed much loss of life and damage to property.

Again, if only a partial territory of the nation is at stake, it may be wiser to give it up rather than destroy human lives, as in fact France and England advised Czechoslovakia to do, when Hitler demanded the Sudeten lands; yet, the Great Powers learned to their detriment that such an apparently limited demand for territory was only a pretext for further and

larger demands. In fact, Hitler followed up with the demand for the whole nation, and disrupted both the institutions and the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia when he annexed still larger territories to the Third Reich, in 1938.

If, however, the sovereignty of the nation is at stake, then that nation must fight even if it is forced to put the lives of its citizens in jeopardy, as Poland was forced to do when it was attacked by Hitler in 1939.

Otherwise, any nation facing a stronger attacker is faced with the issue whether it should fight to the death following the slogan: *either free or dead*, or, assuming that it is better to be a slave than not to be at all, we prefer the slogan: *rather slaves than dead*. This principle seems simple enough to cope with; but in the contemporary situation of a possible war with a communist aggressor, we often hear the high falutin slogan: *better dead than red*. This slogan assumes that life — any life, lived on any terms and in any conditions — is not better than no life at all.

Yet this principle — rather slaves than dead — is practical, and should be followed as far as the individual is concerned; but once again, while the individual is expendable, the nation as a nation is not. This principle is, therefore, valid only as far as the individual, not as far as the nation, is concerned. That is to say, it is better for an individual to be red than to be dead, but it is not better for the U.S. to be red than to be dead, for if the U.S. becomes red, then the U.S. as the U.S. — that is as a free democratic nation of free people — ceases to exist. Consequently, while the individual can choose to be dead or red, the U.S. cannot, for it can only be the U.S. or not be at all.

The nation, therefore, confronted by an aggressor, is concerned not with safeguarding the lives of its citizens, but with preserving its own existence and identity. Consequently, the nation is forced to safeguard its sovereignty when it is threatened, even by putting in jeopardy the lives of its citizens by attacking an aggressive nation and declaring a state of war.

As long as one nation attempts to assert its sovereignty at the expense of another nation, any nation, and even the community of nations itself, is in danger of being plunged in war at the whim of the aggressor. It would be beautiful if no nation ever attacked another nation, but the fact is that nations like men are greedy and they attack one another in the hope that they can increase their power at the expense of their neighbor.

This state of affairs, therefore, contrasts the condition of man as he is with the condition of man as he should be; and the way he should live in peace and love with the way he does live in hate and greed. Only when

the sovereign nations give up their sovereignty by accepting the world government of a federation of world states or a federation of continental federations will the danger of war and aggression be averted, because any nation would know that the moment it attacks another nation, its power will be restrained, and if it persists in its attack, it will eventually destroy itself.

3. LIMITATIONS OF POWER

As long as one nation believes itself to be powerful enough to withstand the attack of another nation, then it might become arrogant enough to bait a rival nation into aggressive action. No nation, however, not even Russia, China or the U.S. would find it profitable to engage in direct confrontation through war, not only because such a direct confrontation would wear them out, but also because no nation knows the extent of its rival's power. Instead, all the major nations are engaged in a cold war which generates a state of tension and anxiety for most of the Western democracies, while at the same time they test both their endurance and their most recent armaments in partial conflicts limited both in territory and in duration.

This control of power was referred to among the European governments as the balance of power, as no nation in Europe would ever let any other nation become too strong, for it would then constitute a danger to all the other nations. So the major powers would manipulate alliances in such a way that they would curb any nation that becomes too arrogant or too greedy for power.

This type of sound policy is well illustrated by the series of alliances undertaken by England since the Renaissance up to recent times:

1512: Alliance of Henry VIII with the Hapsburgs against France.

1515: Alliance of Henry VIII with France against the Hapsburgs.

1522+1542: Alliance of Henry VII with the Hapsburgs against France.

1756: Alliance of Great Britain with Prussia against the Hapsburgs and France.

1793: Alliance of Great Britain with Prussia and the Hapsburgs against Napoleon.

1914: Alliance of Great Britain with France and Russia against Austria and Germany.

1939: Alliance of Great Britain with France and Poland against Germany.

So, it is obvious that the three series of alliances since 1793 are at-

tempts to offset the ambition of Napoleon, Kaiser William II, and Hitler to conquer Europe, and upset the balance of power. Loyalty among nations is a matter of expediency, practically subordinate to the requirements of the balance of power. Thus, the balance of power brings about a 'power configuration among nations' that gives rise to 'a multiple equilibrium.' 'This multiple equilibrium provided a flexible framework in which a number of nations sought to maximize their power and, at the same time, frequently switched sides so as to prevent any one from attaining preponderance.' Stoessinger p. 159-160.

However, while the balance of power in the past was maintained through the 'interplay' of the nations of Europe, now it is shared by a bipolar structure of two superstates - the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. - both outside Europe. This situation tends to make both statesmen and generals anxious, as General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Commander of NATO, said in 1957: 'No military man is pleased with the present *status quo* - two armed camps sitting opposite each other. That would be a hell of a state of affairs to perpetuate.' (quoted by Stoessinger p. 161 from the New York Times, July 17, 1957).

Further, the nations of Europe which determined the destiny of the world shared a moral and legal structure based on the value and dignity of the person. Now, the two superstates are split into two incompatible ethical and legal systems, and from time to time they are faced with a block, and often with a breakdown, in communications, especially in relation to the Bomb.

The Western bloc's view of 'The Communist menace' and the Soviet bloc's conception of 'the imperialist camp of the West' tended to heighten expectations of irrational behaviour. Hence, policies might be based on what one side believed the other side believed, with the danger of an outcome desired by neither.

Stoessinger p. 163.

Moreover, modern technology has made total war equivalent to mass genocide; as a result, while the danger of annihilation for the human race has increased, the preservation of world peace has become more precarious. In fact, the switching of alliances will not offset the danger or the threat of an arrogant or a reckless aggressor, for as long as the great nations have and are willing to use the hydrogen bomb, and perhaps even bacteriological and chemical weapons, it makes no difference which side attacks first. Indeed, as Einstein remarked, if we fight the next war with H-bombs, the survivors may have to go back to bows and arrows.

Today's power is determined and limited by the atomic and hydrogen

stockpile, not by the number of alliances or the size of the army; therefore the balance of power is more correctly labelled *the balance of terror*, for, as Churchill suggested: 'It may well be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached the stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.' (quoted by Stoessinger, p. 162, from the New York Times, March 2, 1955).

Consequently, today the most important single objective of foreign policy is not the promotion of the national interest of any one single nation as a power among powers, even if that power happens to be a world power. The main concern of all nations today is to use their power to ensure and preserve world peace, rather than wage total war with nuclear bombs and nuclear-propelled transportation with the probable result of mass extermination.

Such a use of power would turn might into a right, with the result that power, precisely because it is power, would enforce itself even against the demands of right; yet, power as power is not constituted by right, but by the means available at its disposal to enforce itself.

Yet nations, like people, often do or try to do what is of most advantage to them, even if it is to the disadvantage of other nations, then the nation or group of nations who have enough power to police the rest of the world would have to take it upon themselves to keep order in the world against and in spite of those nations who are out to destroy or enslave the other nations.

Consequently, the politician in using his power as the head of the nation may not be directly interested in applying moral principles for such an application of moral principles may ultimately endanger the very nation or nations he is trying to protect with his intervention. For instance, the attempt to safeguard life and property in S. Vietnam may ultimately prevent the victory of S. Vietnam over N. Vietnam, and thus indirectly ensure the spread of communism, first in S. Vietnam, then in S.E. Asia, and finally in all of Asia and the rest of the world.

Thus, power has to be used in such a way that with all the due safeguards of moral principles, the lesser evil, rather than the greater good, should follow; that is to say, the statesman in making use of power tries to ensure that the situation doesn't become worse than it is. Thus, he would rather do a little evil, and even hurt a comparatively great number of people than safeguard moral principles at the risk of destroying the sovereignty of the nation.

However, while the individual may renounce his life and choose to die

rather than kill, the nation should rather choose to destroy and kill than be destroyed and extinguished. For, while we do honor the man who accepts his own self-destruction as a martyr, if he destroys himself for a worthy cause, we would condemn the people, if they let the nation embark on a policy of self-destruction through a distorted sense of the value of human life.

Both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival. Morgenthau p. 10.

This analysis of the impact of morality on political action may sound harsh and even non-human, but while morality is judged good or bad against the intention of the man and the conformity of his action with the principles of moral law, political action is judged to be efficient or inefficient against the political achievement in that sphere of activity which it was planning to influence, modify or control.

Hegel would even demand the sacrifice of the individual for the ultimate glory or glorification of the state, for man finds his identity as a member of the state; consequently, 'sacrifice for the sake of the individuality of the state is the substantive relation of all the citizens, and is, thus, a universal duty.' Philosophy of Right. p. 333.

However, though moral principles do not constitute a criterion to measure the efficiency of political action, moral principles cannot be ignored with impunity, for the end never justifies the means. If the politician were to follow that slogan, under the pretext of efficiency he would rule the state either with barbarian or with totalitarian terror. For even if he insists he is working for the aggrandizement of the state, he is undermining those very values the state is supposed to stand for. Consequently, the state which is supposed to bind men together into a responsible way of life enslaves them to the arbitrary will and whim of a tyrant.

Thus, since moral principles cannot be the ultimate guideline of political action without running the risk of making such action inefficient, and since political action cannot ignore the restraint of moral principles without running the risk of plunging into barbarism, then the politician must acknowledge the tension rather than the polarity of morality and politics, for though they are often in conflict, they are not incompatible.

The statesman, therefore, will try to resolve such tension by compromise as he tries to ensure that his political action is as moral as it can

be, provided that such loyalty to moral principles does not weaken his action to such an extent that it would ultimately bring about the breakdown and the disruption of the state.

Without force a state can neither come into being nor continue. Force is required within, as well as without; where force has produced firm and enduring results, it seeks and commonly attains a connection with right.... United with right, it becomes worthy of the moral nature of man. Bluntschli. p. 293.

Thus, if he ignores the principle of justice, the politician will plunge the nation into a state of terror, as he follows his policy of live burial in concentration camps and mass executions.

When a man has unlimited power over the flesh and blood of his fellow men, when a man is in a position to degrade another human being to the limit of degradation, he is unable to resist the temptation to do wrong. Tyranny is a habit. In the end it becomes a disease. The best man in the world becomes so brutalized as to be undistinguishable from a wild beast. Blood intoxicates, the spirit becomes susceptible to the extreme abnormalities and these can turn to be enjoyable as the real joys. The possibility of such license sometimes becomes contagious in a whole people; and yet society which despises the official hangman, does not despise the hangman who is all powerful. Dostoevski. House of the Dead.

The statesman should therefore be aware of the limitations that moral principles impose on his power. If he ignores these limitations, and reduces the nation to total submission and the people to political enslavement, as Hitler did during the Nazi regime, he would run the risk that his people will defy all moral restraints and resort to assassination, as the only weapon left to them to regain control of the state, as in fact a group of military and civilian personnel decided to do when they conspired to kill Hitler on July 20, 1944.

Thus, in the very interest of preserving his own power, the statesman must safeguard the power of the other states with whom he has to deal; otherwise he would be practically inviting them to plot against him to regain the power he had seized from them, and once more regain the power they had lost. They may even go further and try to deprive him of the power that he legitimately holds, as in fact the nations of Europe did when they rebelled against Napoleon and tried to get rid of the yoke he had imposed on them.

CONCLUSION: 1. THE RIGHT TO WAR

The nation through the head of the state can engage in war to safeguard the lives of its citizens its institutions and its sovereignty, either against a foreign aggressor, as France did against Germany in 1939-40, or against a revolutionary group which tries to split the nation and change its identity, as the Confederate states did when they split away from the Union.

War may, however, preserve the institutions and the sovereignty of the citizens of the nation itself; but the ultimate purpose of war is to check the enemy, keep him within the frontiers determined by the territory of the land which belongs to him, and restrain his action so that he may not be in a position to destroy or even attempt to destroy the lives, the institutions and the sovereignty of the other nations.

2. THE RIGHT TO REVOLUTION

The power within the nation does not reside in the government, but in the people. The government may exercise such power as the constitution established by the people would grant them, but the ultimate source of power is in the people, for the nation is the people insofar as they accept to be ruled by a government of their choice.

This principle is affirmed in the preamble to the constitution of the U.S.

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

It is always confirmed in the Declaration of Independence:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, . . . That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government. . . .

Consequently, the people as a people have the right to take away the power they have conferred on their government, and establish another or a different form of government, and confer on it such power as they deem it should receive, as the events leading to the American Revolution in 1776 shows, and as the Declaration of Independence states.

When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

This principle of the right to revolution once again shows that the people constituting the nation have the right and the duty to withstand the enemy who is trying to disrupt the nation, even if such resistance entails war and destruction, as once again, the Declaration of Independence affirms:

Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; . . . But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

This country, born in revolution, is still fomenting revolution, as the recent movements among the SDS and the Black Panthers point out; but above all this country is born in freedom, and is always ready to safeguard its freedom with the life of its people.

So I will end with the words of George Washington to the American Troops before the battle of Long Island.

The time is now near at hand which must probably determine whether American are to be freemen or slaves; whether they are to have any property they can call their own; whether their houses and farms are to be pillaged and destroyed and themselves consigned to a state of wretchedness from which no human efforts will deliver them. The fate of unborn millions will now depend, under God, on the courage and conduct of this army. Our cruel and unrelenting enemy leaves us only the choice of a brave resistance or the most abject submission. We have, therefore, to resolve to conquer or to die.

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THE CERES INSCRIPTION¹

By JOSEPH BUSUTTIL

CERERI. IULIAE. AVGVSTAE.
 DIVI. AVGVSTI. MATRI.
 TI. CAESARIS. AVGVSTI.
 LVTATIA. C.F. SACERDOS. AVGVSTAE.²
 IMP. PERPET.³ VXOR.⁴
 M. LIVI.⁵ M.F. QVI. OPTATI. FLAMINIS. G(A)VL.⁶
 IVLIAE. AVGVSTI. IMP. PERPET.³ CVM.⁷ V.
 LIBERIS S.P.⁸ CONSACRAVIT.

Cereri Iuliae Augustae, Divi Augusti, matri Tiberii Caesaris Augusti, Lutatia, Caii filia, sacerdos Augustae, imperatoris perpetui, uxor Marci Livi, Marci filii, Quirina tribu, Optati Flaminis Gauli, Iuliae Augusti, imperatoris perpetui, cum V liberis sua pecunia consecravit.

To Ceres Julia Augusta,⁹ (wife) of the Divine Augustus,¹⁰ mother of Tiberius Caesar Augustus,¹¹ Lutatia, daughter of Caius (and) priestess of

¹For this inscription Cf F. Abela, *Descrittione di Malta*, Malta, 1647, p. 215; O. Brès, *Malta antica illustrata*, Roma, 1810, p. 251; A. Caruana, *Report on Phoenician, Greek and Roman Antiquities*, Malta, 1882, p. 137; id *Frammento Critico*, p. 290; Ruggiero, *Dizionario epigrafico di antichità Romane*, Vol. III, 1895-1919, p. 434; C.I.L. No 7501; Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, Vol. I, No 121; *Documents illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius*, collected by V. Ehrenberg and A.H.M. Jones, Oxford, 1955, No. 126.

²AVGVS Abela, Brès; AVGVSTAL Caruana.

³The two words are bracketed by Dessau and Ehrenberg.

⁴Omitted by Abela and Brès. The latter adds TI. IMP. after *Perpet.*

⁵M. IVLIO Abela, Brès.

⁶Omitted by Abela, Brès and Caruana.

⁷Omitted by Abela, Brès and Caruana.

⁸*sibi* Abela; *suis* Brès.

⁹In Latin inscriptions the name of the goddess with whom Julia Augusta was identified was placed first. Cf. V. Ehrenberg, op.cit. No. 127: *Iunoni Liviae*, To Juno Livia. In Greek inscriptions the name of the goddess comes after the name of Julia Augusta. Cf. V. Ehrenberg, op.cit. No. 129: Julia Augusta Hestia.

¹⁰The husband's name in the genitive was usually added to the wife's name to make identification easier. Of Ehrenberg, op.cit. No. 127: *Iunoni Liviae Augusti*, To Juno Livia (wife) of Augustus.

¹¹A Greek inscription reproduces almost the same words: Cf. V. Ehrenberg, op. cit. 89.