

PORTUGAL AND THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN: A SUGGESTED SURVEY

by HARRY BERNSTEIN

THE lines of late medieval and early modern trade that once linked Portugal with Barcelona and Spain ran overland from Atlantic Lisbon to Mediterranean Spain. They carried goods from Brazil as well as metals from Spanish America during the sixty years when Madrid dominated Lisbon. The section of Fernand Braudel's study of modern Mediterranean history which he calls 'L'Espagne quitte la Méditerranée', he might have also described as Spain pulls Portugal into the Mediterranean.¹

After the discovery of America, the great wealth of Spanish American gold and silver plied these land routes. During the eighteenth century some unknown amounts and carats of the bright Brazilian diamonds also went both by overland and by sea to reach Barcelona, or to get to Italy. Although exposed to the costly raids of Catalan and Pyrenean *bandeirismo* and brigandage/banditry, the risks of trading overland from Portugal to the Mediterranean were probably far less dangerous than the sea route.²

North African piracy and privateering made the Portuguese routes into the Western Mediterranean a problem, from their conquest of Ceuta in 1415 to their practice of using naval convoys in 1800 and later. While the *bandeirismo* and banditry on land were a sort of class struggle of Christian versus Christian, the North African and Portuguese encounters were the war of Christianity versus Islam, combining the crusade-reconquista with the gains of commerce and the income from ransoms. Across its five hundred years of activity the Santa Misericórdia of Lisbon paid the Algerian attackers enormous sums in ransoms.

As goods and gold went into the Mediterranean, peoples left the Mediterranean to live and work in Portugal. The Genoese and some Florentines were there early. Catalans lived and were established in Lisbon at the same time that the Genoese and other Italians

were. This migration of merchants took place in late medieval and early modern times. Then, in the eighteenth century, Maltese came to Portugal.

The Maltese in Lisbon lived by the riverfront, as sellers of fruits and vegetables. Some made their living by drying and selling fish in *cabanas* by the Tejo. The great historian of Lisbon, E. Freire de Oliveira reports their presence in 1737, calling them 'vendedores ambulantes' who set up their 'tents' in the *terreiro do paco*. Their services in Lisbon were different from their work in Barcelona.³

It is true that the people of the Mediterranean had much in common by ancestry and appearance. It is also noteworthy that their rivalry was keen and often warlike. Competition sprang up even where they produced much that was common. The common culture of olives, wine, and of clay tile has been well known. This trio was connected with the classical heritage. The Portuguese discovery of Brazil brought new products: Pernambuco dyewood for one thing. By the mid-eighteenth century Pombal of Portugal had reduced the Portuguese importation of rice from Sicily, from Genoa, or by way of Venice. His promotion of large-scale fishing in the waters off Algarve shaped a new era. Rice production changed the landscape and economy of Aveiro to this day.⁴

This competition in Mediterranean products was even better expressed in wine and olive production. In the mid-nineteenth century, Alexandre Herculano, Portugal's most outstanding historian and historical novelist, and a very successful farmer, defended Portugal's own olive oil as being far better than the French (Provence), which was then being imported by prosperous Lisbon merchants using ships from Marseilles. Classical similarity gave way to national differences and local variation in growth and quality — free trade arguments versus tariff protections were also involved.

Diplomacy also formed links that connected Portugal with the Mediterranean. Balance of power in both the Iberian and Italian peninsulas reflected friendly as well as hostile positions. Competition with Castile in Catalonia and in the Italian balance compelled some degree of policy even in distant places such as Barcelona and Turin.

The Portuguese anti-Castilian position in the revolt for independence was helped by the Catalan Revolt against Castile. While Catalan (i.e. Barcelona merchants) followed the overland routes to Lisbon to seek aid, Portuguese emissaries went by sea to Barcelona, going on by ship to Italy and into Mediterranean France. Such a mutual interest of Portugal and Catalonia never again

reached as high as it did in 1640 when their struggles for freedom from Spain coincided. As Portugal rose to independence and Catalonia declined to dependence, the balance in the Iberian peninsula changed permanently.

The Portuguese published many books and pamphlets at this time to record their attention to Catalonia and Barcelona. Private letters abound that have described the mutual sentiments and hopes that they could have shared. Pamphlets and newspapers in the Pombal Collection of the Biblioteca Nacional attested to this Luso-Catalan relation not only in 1640 and 1641, but in the War of the Spanish Succession (1704), and as late as the Napoleonic Era (early nineteenth century). These early journals, like many of the books and pamphlets, were written in Portuguese. The high level of interest in Catalonia probably reflected the offer of the Barcelonese to elect João IV of Portugal as their king, as their forefathers had once elected Pedro in exchange for help against vengeful Castile.

The Mascarenhas Mission of 1641 showed the Portuguese some of the dangers of using the sea route. The risks of the sea, its currents, calms, and shallows were not as catastrophic as the *mistral* winds that blew out into the Mediterranean and North Africa, all the way down the France's Rhône Valley. Convoys, navies, and diplomatic missions were scattered, shipwrecked, and otherwise destroyed. For the Portuguese, the Spanish seapower, coastguards, and maritime presence in the Mediterranean was further proof positive of the enmity of Castile, both in Iberian as well as Italian land-and-sea geography.⁵

In spite of the Portuguese effort, the Restoration succeeded in Portugal, while independence failed in Catalonia. Although the Portuguese King greeted the Catalan deputation which came to him, 'constantly with a smile on his face and showing signs of his great pleasure ...', said one Catalan contemporary who saw this 'because I was right behind our Ambassador as he read our declaration ...', Catalonia nevertheless succumbed.⁶ As war, diplomacy, and treaties secured Portugal's borders and guaranteed her independence as a nation, the commercial force of the eighteenth century renewed the momentum of economics which continued to bring trade into the Mediterranean. Some of that trade, although Luso-Brazilian in origin was more colonial than Portuguese.

Portugal's exports to Barcelona in the eighteenth century included large and regular shipments of Brazilwood. The strong textile industry in Barcelona made extensive use and developed special techniques for using the 'color portugués on cloths.

Brazilwood ('palo Brasil' or Ferlambuch wood) provided an invaluable red dye and coloring. The wood trade had declined even before 1800 because of high prices, but after that other factors such as the discovery of chemical dyes helped to shift the economic geography of the trade. The incorporation in 1755 of the Catalan Company trading to America at the time when the Pernambuco Company was also founded for Brazil, had set up a Spanish agency which could import the *brasilete* woods ('de nova selva') from the forests of Santa Marta (New Granada or Colombia). The red dyes for Barcelona were supplemented by the blue or indigo dyes and plants from Campeche. We do not know if the Catalan Company had any illegal trade with Brazil in other items.

Perhaps the price rise imposed on Pernambuco wood by the Portuguese royal monopoly for higher royal income, cost the Portuguese and Brazilians their dyewood market in Barcelona. Pernambuco wood from Brazil sold at nine libras an arroba, which was a high price.⁷ Barcelonese textile shops and factories turned more and more to the very good dyes of France, Italy and Aragon. The Brazilian dyes had served admirably in the coloring of the *indianas*, a cloth and dress as multi-colored as the *chita* (Maltese gingham or calico) which the Portuguese liked so much. In 1785 the Junta de Comercio of Barcelona was able to get a master of silk dyeing to write his book *Quadern* ('Arte de la Tintura ...') as a text for other guild masters, apprentices, and journeymen on the art of using Pernambuco or Brazilwood.

In 1786 Genoa was getting tobacco, Brazilwoods, rice, cotton, cacao, sugar and coffee from Brazil, reshipped from Portugal, while Genoa sent Portugal velours from Piedmont (Turin).⁸ Recently published correspondence of the Lisbon merchant, F. Pinheiro, documented the large imports of dyewoods into Lisbon from Brazil. These letters from a merchant who traded with Brazil and Northern Europe also proved the continued activity of Italian merchants as far away as Brazil. Pinheiro's largest trade was not with the Spanish Mediterranean, yet his letters and reports showed imports into Portugal of Catalan *agardente*, as well as *passas* or raisins from Alicante.⁹ Separately, E. Freire de Oliveira, author of the multi-volumed *History of Lisbon*, referred to the large amount of tavern sales. Valencia shipped to Portugal *chapins*, a kind of high soled shoe or slipper.

The strong *tanoeiros* guild (makers of barrels, casks and pipes) were charged with checking any liquid imports, if they came in casks. They had the authority to stamp the barrels. These coopers, one of the most powerful and influential guilds in Portugal, did not

use the Pernambuco-Brazil wood for their containers, as the carpenters did for their cabinets and furniture. The coopers used other woods, oak from Portugal and even wood shipped from Hamburg (Germany). This guild was ever alert, both to the law and to safeguard their own and the royal interest, at the customs house or the Paço da Madeira. Foreigners were also buying casks, barrels and containers, not only for the wine, brandy and olive oil, but also for the needs of the British Navy at Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean.¹⁰

In short, as Frédéric Mauro once wrote, Barcelona was one of the cities of the Western Mediterranean to which came the goods of Brazil and Portugal.¹¹ We can now add that the Western Mediterranean also sent goods to Portugal, and also perhaps, to Brazil. Pernambuco wood and Brazilian cotton found uses more and more. Brazilian cotton substituted for the Malta supply in Barcelona's textile production. The great and dazzling supply of Brazilian diamonds and semi-precious stones adorned the garments and bodies of the Catalan rich.

It was not only commerce and traders that moved. Diplomacy and international relations went right along with commerce, into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Diplomatic ties and international relations not only made up for and balanced the separated geography, but also added to this sum of the survey of the Portuguese presence in the Mediterranean. Moving from the background of modern history into the foreground of the nineteenth century with its Napoleonic and Anglo-French wars and naval battles, it is clear that religion, the Church, and empire-building were absent from the Portuguese diplomacy and action in the Mediterranean. Portugal's comparatively slight presence was that of an acceptable guest and visitor, not a conqueror or owner.

Even from an earlier time, that of Minister Pombal, the efforts to improve and modernize the Portuguese Navy were closely related to both the growth of commerce and diplomacy. It is not an accident that Pombal's procedures for the revival of the navy, arsenals and shipbuilding were timed to accompany the organization of commercial corporations that depended on sea exploitation or maritime communications, such as the Pernambuco and Para companies in America. Yet, in 1751, even before the stock companies were created, Pombal had also organized the Companhia Geral dos Pescadores do Reino de Algarve (a Fishing Company), ostensibly to organize the sardine and tuna fishing along those waters leading into the Mediterranean. In that era of Portuguese boundary disputes with the Spanish in Latin America, Pombal also had it in

mind to drive Spanish 'intruders' from occupying the beaches. He went so far as to plan a new Portuguese town at the mouth of the Guadiana River. This would have brought Portuguese commercial fishing, and the patrols of the Portuguese Navy, closer to the Gibraltar base and entrance to the Mediterranean and North Africa.¹²

The age of war between Portugal and France from 1795 to 1812 greatly extended these early purposes of modernizing the Portuguese Navy and merchant vessels for use in the Mediterranean. The ministers of the later eighteenth century, Martinho e Melo (1755-1785) and Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho (the Conde de Linhares) continued at the end of the century, and in the beginning of the nineteenth, to promote the development of their Navy. Scientific reforms, schools, geography, modern workmanship in the arsenals, accompanied their reforms and brought wider horizons within reach, in America as well as in the Mediterranean.

In 1793 Portuguese troops had gone into Catalonia again, in order to help Spain, but at great sacrifice in deaths, injury and illness, leaving Barcelona after Spain negotiated the peace in 1795. In a few years the new Portuguese Navy replaced the army, taking part with the British in the sea battles off Alexandria, the fight for Malta (1798), and even later, in the battle of Trafalgar. The small but changed Navy proved useful to the British fleet in the Mediterranean.

The presence of fixed British sea power at Gibraltar and of more mobile Portuguese squadrons in the Mediterranean made the greater movement from the Algarve-Atlantic-Gibraltar lanes safer and swifter. But they also suggested something more in the line of dynastic diplomacy. In 1807 when the Portuguese royal family and the convoy left Lisbon for Brazil, following the French invasion, an idea was proposed. An exchange of letters between Lord Strangford (British Minister to Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro) and the Conde de Barca (Portuguese Foreign Minister) suggested in October 1807 that ships that could not reach Madeira or Brazil should instead sail for Gibraltar where the British could sustain and protect them (this was two years after the Battle of Trafalgar).

Some years before this, in his address of 1798 to the newly formed Portuguese Real Sociedade Militar, Maritima e Geografica, the Minister Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho (Conde de Linhares), now the Minister for Navy and Overseas, called for still more modernization and reorganization of both the Portuguese Navy and the guild labor and skilled workers of the shipyards. His purpose was to provide access to 'those coasts close to us, which are going to be ... frequently visited by our merchant marine ... the Coasts on

the other side of the Mediterranean [and] those of the Baltic and those of South America.' That same year the small Portuguese Navy took part in the Battle for Malta. Linhares' speech thus also strengthened, as he said himself, the commercial credit which London insurers were giving to Portuguese merchant ships now moving their freight into the Mediterranean.

Linhares gave a third address to that Society (forerunner of the present-day Geographical Society of Lisbon). Here he referred to the Crown's new practice of sending Portuguese Navy cruisers against the Algerian pirates of North Africa. He emphasized in several other addresses the recent Portuguese Navy and merchant ship convoy system which secured 'for the vessels of his Royal Highness the rich commerce of the Mediterranean.' In spite of the insistence of the Lisbon city council that all ships coming to Portugal from Sicily, Oran and the Levant must be inspected for their sanitation and cleanliness from disease, the exchange of Luso-Brazilian products for those of the Mediterranean continued. Mediterranean trade also followed the flag to Tunisia as well as Turin (then known as Savoy or Piedmont). The Portuguese diplomacy in Turin also seemed to have a way of balancing the Spanish power in the Iberian peninsula with that of the Spanish power in the Italian peninsula (Naples).

This same Sousa Coutinho (Linhares) himself had fond feelings for Turin. He had previously been the Portuguese Minister to Savoy. He had married a Piedmont lady.¹³ Coutinho also had many times used the example of Turin as a model for Portuguese credit and fiscal policies, and how to learn from Turin's example of good banking and credit. Generally declared to be pro-British in his outlook (which does not contradict the above) it is possible that Coutinho (like the later Minister Cavour in Turin) saw both in Turin and England the stamp of creditworthy Portuguese commerce and banking procedures.

His speeches and policies several times renewed the idea that Brazilian products would not only enrich Portugal, but would also come to the Mediterranean. He expected that the new trade into the Mediterranean would open the way for 'colonial goods', such as Brazilwood, cotton, tobacco and the precious and semi-precious products of the Brazilian mines. This Sousa Coutinho Ministry may well have linked Luso-Brazilian products as well as Portugal's diplomacy to the Western Mediterranean and to Italy.¹⁴ In diplomacy, briefly, the decline of a helpless Catalonia in the Iberian peninsula was compensated somewhat by the Luso-Savoy-Piedmont relationship in the Italian peninsula.

We are told by Damião Peres (the noted contemporary Portuguese historian) that the political struggles in Italy after the middle of the nineteenth century were closely watched in Portugal. He explained that the creation of the Kingdom of Italy from that of Savoy-Piedmont-Sardinia provoked anxiety in Portugal 'where some extreme spirits felt that the unification of Germany and Italy endangered the independence of Portugal.'¹⁵

The forces of nationalism, unification, and even of the Socialism which arose in Mediterranean lands after 1840 were as important as those more economic and geographic elements of the wind and the sea which moved the trade and the diplomacy. The ideas of the nineteenth century are rich with influence and energy which have also moved men and even changed history. The temper and the times of the years 1868 to 1874 are strong with events such as the Spanish Revolution, the Papacy and the Papal States, the socialism and federalism of Catalonia, and the effects within Portugal. It was also an era of Frédéric Mistral, his *félibres*, the revival of Provençal and Catalan cultural and literary nationalism, some of which found echo and praise in Portuguese letters and essays, as well as in a few expressions of national politics.

One of the best known and internationally respected of the present-day (1976) historians and writers of Portugal, A.H. de Oliveira Marques, has again raised the prospect of the Iberian Union between the changing Spain and the changed Portugal. The prospect of unity between the two kingdoms proposed one hundred years ago by Prim in 1868 and 1870 apparently still has signs of life and interest, based now upon an additional observation that a Porto/Lisbon axis should meet with a Barcelona/Valencia axis which would again join the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

During those years of the past century when colonialism and imperialism were at their height from 1870 to 1920, powers such as Britain and Germany looked to Portugal to help them enter the Mediterranean. Portugal was thus also the way-station for passage to the Mediterranean, Suez and points east. This politic and political reality led to the German policy under Bismarck of uniting Spain and Portugal (i.e. the Mediterranean) under another race of Kings: this time the Hohenzollern candidate. That a Hohenzollern could make Portugal the Piedmont of a united and royalist Iberian unification might now seem far-fetched, but the entire balance of power relation of North Europe might have been upset by any such enlargement of the Iberian population, resources, market economics, military position and size.

These large questions involving Iberian power, size and strength

were very upsetting to France, and became one of the elements in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Differences between the Great Powers over any changing balance in proposals for a united Iberian parallel with other considerations and ambitions having to do this time with the Portuguese place in Africa. The back seat which Bismarck offered Portugal was not so removed from the scene as the memorandum proposed in the Italian Sonnino Cabinet of World War I, which proposed Italian acquisition of Portugal's African colonies. These internal differences between the Great Powers matched the internal differences between their peoples.

Differences existed and exist between workers and peoples of Southern Europe and those of Northern Europe. Latin European workers have had in common the fact that they resembled each other in the economic stage they have reached. Workers in Portugal, Italy and Spain had a predominance of rural laborers rather than factory workers or proletariat. Church domination as well as feudal landlordism kept these workers illiterate and ignorant. Only such cities as Porto, Lisbon, Barcelona and Turin emerged from this background into the better and freer light of liberalism, Socialism and literacy. As a result some individuals of liberal ideas and others of Socialist principles have reached across the Mediterranean, penetrating the domination of the society and proving the power of their ideas.

One should therefore conclude this survey with some appreciation of the place of rebels and radicals in Mediterranean affairs. The contribution of Mediterranean men to Portuguese liberalism as well as Socialism has deserved a place, and merits mention.¹⁶ Sometimes their presence was but coincidence, and we lack the proof of any yet-known connection. Still, it is in this trace of history that the humanity of the Mediterranean relationship takes its place alongside commerce, diplomacy, geography, and naval wars.

Giovanni Durando of Piedmont, one of two brothers who fought for the Portuguese liberals during the Peninsular War, stayed long enough to take part with Pedro's rebels in the siege of 1832, and precede the radical democratic reforms of 1836.¹⁷ He surely can contrast with the force of Italian reaction and Church influence, in the example of the reactionary Charles Albert of Savoy, the Mediterranean despot who, when driven out of Turin, abdicated to Portugal, to a monastery in Porto.

Mediterranean radicalism had as much persistence as Mediterranean reaction. Radicalism moved from east to west in some other ways, trying to make Portuguese workers more class conscious. In 1870 a committee nominated by the Socialist Congress

of Barcelona sent an appeal to workers in Portugal to join the International Association of Workingmen. After the Paris Commune, three Spanish delegates to the Association came to Lisbon to set up a section or centro. A few years later this became the Socialist Party of Portugal. José Fontana (1841-1876), a founder and high intellectual of Lisbon's earliest Socialism, was one of the great Mediterranean or South European Socialists. Fontana came from Ticino (the Italian Swiss town) to organize the Portuguese workers into strikes, discipline, unionism and political action. Like the Barcelona Socialists, Fontana was also both national and international-minded, but always loyal to the interests of the working-class, even though he rose himself from being a printer to becoming a publisher.¹⁸

For centuries Italy as well as Catalonia and Portugal had nourished a strong and talented guild society of workers, soon to be forced open by the energetic liberal capitalism of the nineteenth century. Migrants and immigrants could pass from one of these countries to the other to look for work with their artisanry and skills. Was it then only a coincidence of parallel economic stage that brought about the abolition of both the Lisbon and Barcelona guilds in the same year 1834? Was it but another coincidence that the Fascisms and 'corporate' state of Italy and Portugal appeared at the same time in the 1920s? Could it be that similar conditions influenced these Mediterranean events? The New State of Salazar, together with that of Mussolini, must also have followed the precedents of the jacobins, carbonari, and even Mediterranean Socialists in pointing out the routes and directions of their origins, if not the history and causes of their origin.

NOTES:

¹ F. Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'Époque de Philippe II*, 2nd ed. révisé et augmenté, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1966), II-467.

² Braudel reproduced the maps of the overland trade routes found in Gonzalo Menéndez Pidal, *Los Caminos en la Historia de España* (1951), showing the position of Barcelona.

³ E. Freire de Oliveira, *Elementos Para a Historia do Município de Lisboa*, 17 vols. plus a 2 vol. Index, (Lisboa: Camara Municipal, 1882-1911), XIII-281, XIV-476.

⁴ V. Magalhães Godinho, *Prix et Monnaies au Portugal*, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, VI^e Section (Paris: Libraire Ammand Colin, 1955), p. 16.

⁵ *Relação da Embaixada do Padre Mestre Inacio Mascarenhas a Catalunha da 1^a Edição de 1641* (L. de Anveres, publisher of Lisbon). Reimpressa por Edgar Prestage, (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1926); Catalan report of Mascarenhas in *Arquivo de la Corona de Aragon, Memorial Historico Español*, XXII, pp. 64, 66, 378-379; XXV, pp. 369, 376-377, 380.

⁶ Prestage did not know that the Manuscript #513 in the University of Coimbra Library told the story of the Portuguese reception of the Catalan mission. Many pamphlets and contemporary letters, some from Lisbon, others from Barcelona also reported the Catalan-Portugal contacts.

⁷ Pedro Molas Ribalta, *Los Gremios Barceloneses del Siglo XVIII. La Estructura Corporativa ante el Comienzo de la Revolucion Industrial* (Madrid, 1970), pp. 199, 522.

⁸ See trade records in papers of Grao Para and Maranhao Company. Arquivo de Ministerio das Finanças (Lisbon), vol. 123, marked 'Copiador de Itálie e Norte', for the company's letters to their agents, factors and correspondents in Marseilles, Genoa, Venice and even Trieste.

⁹ Luis Lisanti, *Negocios Coloniais* (Uma correspondencia comercial de seculo XVIII), Braizl, Ministerio da Fazenda, 5 vols. (São Paulo: Visão Editorial, 1973), III-790; Freire de Oliveira, *op. cit.*, XVII, pp. 142-146, 177-178.

¹⁰ Brazilwoods were too costly to be used for wine casks or barrels, or olive oil containers.

¹¹ F. Mauro, *Le Portugal et l'Atlantique au XVII^e Siècle*, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, VI^e Section, (Paris: 1960), p. 390.

¹² Magalhaes Godinho, *op. cit.*, p. 252n., tells of an Extremadura Company which in 1747 combined with the Granada Company to sell silks to Portugal.

¹³ Marquez de Funchal, *O Conde de Linhares: Dom Rodrigo Domingos Antônio de Sousa Coutinho*, (Lisbon: Typographia Bayard, 1908), Doc. 41, pp. 278-280.

¹⁴ 'Coleção de Portugal' documents in Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro; Sousa Coutinho's letter of 1800 referring to 'Portuguese Consuls' in Barcelona, Alicante, Cartagena and Malaga.

¹⁵ Damião Peres, *Historia de Portugal*, VII, pp. 389-395, quotation taken from A. Serpa Pimentel, *Da Nacionalidade e do Governo Representativo*, (1881), p. 74.

¹⁶ Out of the elected membership of Portugal's great historian and novelist, Alexandre Herculano, to the Turin Royal Academy of Sciences, came Herculano's personal and political friendship with the Piedmontese liberal historian, Luigi Cibrario (minister of education for Cavour).

¹⁷ G.F.H. Berkeley, *Italy in the Making, 1815 to 1846*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1932-1940), I pp. 82, 151; III p. 29n.

¹⁸ See the *Almanaque de José Fontana*, (Lisboa: 1885-86).

EDUCATION IN THE CLASSICAL MEDITERRANEAN WORLD

by CHARLES MIZZI

INTRODUCTION

The following essays an examination of the nature of education in the 'World of Antiquity'. It attempts to answer how people experienced education, how they viewed it, supported it and were changed by it.

It is well at the outset to establish limits for the inquiry. The World of Antiquity, a priori, includes the cultures and civilizations bordering the Mediterranean, particularly the Eastern where grew the most active civilizations, the cultures to which twentieth century societies trace their beginnings. The time span of 1000 B.C. to the establishment of Christianity neatly brackets not only the glories of Athens and Rome, but also the changes wrought by religion, which ethic is held to be basic to Western European Civilization.

The usual terms – culture, social agency, civilization, etc. are used according to usual scholarly protocols. Education, however, the central concern of this essay needs to be defined more carefully.

Education is usually accepted as that collection of customs, duties, exercises, formal and informal arrangements by which members of a culture can be said to become assimilated. By historical, social and anthropological standards, education is the process, no matter how conducted, of acculturation.

Historians are wont to view education as the process,¹ that a culture or a civilization establishes in order to safeguard and carry on its traditions and its values. In a narrower sense, education becomes the formal process by which a child is taught those things necessary to become accepted in the world of adults and eventually function as an effective member of society.

This view is unnecessarily limiting. Central to the thesis being