

MARTIN I OF ARAGON AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR
PEACE AND PRISONER EXCHANGE
WITH TUNIS (1398-1410)

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THE course of relations between the crowns of Aragon and Tunis in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries has been studied extensively in the works of Capmany, Mas Latrie, Gimenez Soler, Brunschvig and Dufourcq, among others.¹ On the basis of their work, an overview emerges which indicates that fairly continuous relations were maintained between the crowns in order to protect an important commercial relationship.

With the advent of Pere el Gran to the throne in 1276 relations between the two crowns entered a new phase. It was the wars between the crown of Aragon and the Angevins and their allies over the control of the island of Sicily which brought the crown of Aragon into a different posture toward Tunis. In this new state of affairs, Tunis was viewed not only as a commercial source of funds (badly needed to carry out an expansionistic foreign policy) but also as a source of revenue in the form of tribute. The tribute in question was substantial and had been paid by Tunis to the rulers of Sicily from the time of Frederick II.² This tribute was claimed by the crown of Aragon when its rule became established there and was acknowledged by Tunis in the treaty of Panissars in 1285.³ That treaty, and the treaty signed in 1360, were agreements signed when the crown of Aragon was in the most favorable bargaining position and, for that reason, both treaties acknowledged substantial monetary claims by the crown against Tunis.

The situation began to change with the accession of Abu-l-'Abbas to the crown of Tunis in 1370. Abu-l-'Abbas was a strong ruler who restored the realm of Tunis to its former size by retaking many breakaway areas such as Bougie, Susa, and Mahdia.⁴ It was under Abu-l-'Abbas that Tunis began to develop an expansionistic policy

in the Mediterranean. This policy came into conflict with the attempts of the crown of Aragon, under Joan I (1387-1395) and Marti I⁵ (1395-1410), to quell rebellions on Sicily and Sardinia and reassert its power over the large-scale empire it claimed in the Mediterranean. This policy also came into conflict with the traditional posture of Tunis as the minor power in relation to the crown of Aragon as the major power. No longer were Pere el Gran or Pere el Cerimoniós (1336-1387) on the throne leading an empire fully committed to its destiny of Mediterranean expansion. Instead, the crown of Aragon was faced with what could have become a major insurrection in its sphere; its position appears to have been somewhat weak, or at least vulnerable.

In contrast, at the very same time that the crown of Aragon seems to have been most vulnerable, Tunis adopted an aggressive stance toward its Western neighbors on the Mediterranean, and its corsairs began harassing shipping and attacking coastal towns and islands. In order to put an end to these depredations, a joint Franco-Genoese expedition was mounted in 1390 and made an attack against Tunis at the port of Mahdia.⁶ When the combined expedition failed in its attack on Mahdia and, therefore, in its attempt to quell Tunisian power, Genoa was forced to sign a humiliating treaty with Tunis in 1391. This treaty differed from all previous treaties signed by Western powers with Tunis in that it included a set ransom price to be paid for the captured Christian warriors. Normally, treaties of peace tended to stipulate free exchange of captives in a return to the *status quo ante bellum*.⁷ Therefore a new element has entered the picture. It is this element that will prominently reemerge in future dealings between the crowns of Aragon and Tunis.

By the year 1399, it seems apparent that a major crisis was looming between the realms of Aragon and Tunis. In that year, Martin wrote a letter in which he refers to the fact that the kings of Tunis and Tlemsen were interested in returning 1500 Christian captives who were citizens of the crown of Aragon. From this unusually large number of captives it would seem that just prior to 1399 relations between the realms had reached an all-time low. Documents of the period attest to raids on islands under the control of the crown of Aragon, and in August or September of 1397 Torreblanca and Orpesa on the mainland (in Valencia) had been sacked by four galleys from Bougie.⁸ In this attack alone, 800 captives had been taken. In addition, several eucharistic hosts in their tabernacle had been stolen from the church in Torreblanca. This act caused an enormous sense of outrage in the kingdom and

the cry for revenge could not be ignored. The crown could not stand for this aggression on the part of Tunis and yet, because of rebellions in its empire, was not in a position to begin an all-out attack on the aggressor. For that reason, Martin seems to have begun a tortuous course of diplomacy geared to solving both problems at the same time. Within this course of action the very human element involving 1500 prisoners became secondary to considerations of state.

A brief detour at this point to discuss the specifics of the problem of the prisoners in question seems to begin in the year 1393. It is to that year that I date two letters addressed to Martin from captives in Tunis.⁹ In these letters from the captives of Sicily and Gozo the prisoners describe their condition to Martin. Their claim was that they were forced to work night and day and were placed in leg irons upon returning from their labors. They further remonstrated that they were kept naked and barefoot and in a state of starvation. In a touching line they stated, 'the human mind cannot comprehend nor the human tongue describe the pains and tribulations that we suffer ...' Further, in the letter from the prisoners of Gozo, the claim was also made that many of them, their wives, and their children, were being converted to Islam by means of torture. It is these letters, and others like them, which seem to be referred to by Martin in March of 1398 when he informed a court official that in response to letters from captives he had decided to send an ambassador to Tunis to arrange for prisoner exchange.¹⁰ This official was asked to arrange for a ship at no cost to the crown, if possible, to take ambassador Pere Queralt and the members of his party to Tunis. Yet in May of 1399, more than a year after Martin had ordered the drafting of the preliminary instructions for his ambassador, Queralt and his party still had not left on their mission. It is apparent that the reason for the delay was the North African crusade mounted by a Vallencian and Mallorcan armada and that, in effect, other considerations had been placed ahead of the question of the Christian captives.

The manifest purpose of the North African crusade of 1398 was to retaliate against Tunis for the attack on Torreblanca of 1397. In no way was the fate of the prisoners being considered by the crusaders. This venture was solely constituted for the purpose of vengeance. According to the *Anales* of Zurita, Martin had secured papal authorization for the crusade in 1397.¹¹ In this way, the costs of the armada would be paid for out of church revenues collected in the kingdom. In February of 1398 Martin requested that the Valencians elect Huc de Santa Pau, the leaders of the expedi-

tion which had conquered Djerba in 1393, as captain of the armada. Instead the Valencians chose Vilaragut. A month later, in March of 1398, Martin ordered the drafting of the document referred to above, where he revealed his intention of beginning diplomatic negotiations with Tunis for the return of the prisoners. While these two courses of action seem mutually contradictory, that is planning an attack while, at the same time, preparing a peace mission, later events seem to indicate that Martin intended to employ the sacred armada as a diplomatic weapon to be used, in the same way as the peace mission, for reasons of state. In addition, Martin needed the armada to release the pent-up furor of his subjects against the Tunisian corsairs. The extent of this furor is revealed in a document dated 30 June 1399 where Martin informed his officials that although the armada had left the port of Valencia, the member of would-be crusaders congregating there represented a threat to Moors of the kingdom.¹³ That he ordered execution for any who refused to obey the order to disperse indicates how unruly the situation had become.

The evidence for interpreting Martin's dual intentions regarding the use to which the armada would be put is, to begin with, that in August of 1398, a year after the attack on Torreblanca, when the crusade finally began its mission, the armada did not attack Bougie, its natural target, but Tedellis. Because Tedellis was not at that moment under the control of Tunis but, rather, being held by the Abdalwadides, enemies in long standing of the Hafsid of Tunis, it would appear that the attack represented more a diplomatic show of force than the preliminaries to war.¹⁴ Then in September of 1398, directly after the attack on Tedellis and before the armada could have a chance to engage in other attacks on the North African coast, Martin despatched it to aid the Pope at Avignon.¹⁵ This effectively ended the North African campaign for 1398. By December of that same year Martin was in a position, once again, of being able to reopen diplomatic negotiations with Tunis. To this effect, he wrote to the Valencians requesting a ship for delivering an ambassador to Tunis, and he further requested that they promise not to harm the subjects of the crown of Tunis nor the prisoners taken in the attack on Tedellis. From this document, two things are apparent. The first is that Martin knew full well that Tedellis was not a Tunisian dependency (because it is clear he distinguishes its citizens from those of Tunis) and that, therefore, the attack on Tedellis could not have been carried out in the mistaken belief that it constituted an attack on the

crown of Tunis. Second, Martin seems to be contemplating using the prisoners from Tedellis as bargaining tools. This deliberate use of captives for purposes of negotiations was a prominent element in all of the diplomatic dealings which occurred between the crowns of Aragon and Tunis from this point onward.

The year 1399 was devoted again to attempts to combine peaceful negotiations with force. In January of that year, Queralt was advised to stand by to begin his mission.¹⁶ Yet, in May, Martin authorised the armada to attack all Saracen states, with the exception of Granada and Egypt where peace treaties were in effect.¹⁷ But he also authorised the armada to attack the rebels on Corsica and Sardinia, indicating strongly the potential use being made of that fleet.¹⁸ This time, the crusaders did manage to attack Tunis at Bone, in August 1399, but, in fact, Martin had attempted, too late, to deflect the armada to Sicily to put down a rebellion that was threatening his son's rule on that island.¹⁹ However, because the attack did come off, the Tunisian question and that of the prisoners opened up again when the Tunisians, in reprisal, attacked Terranova in Sicily and captured the bishop of Syracuse. The question of prisoner exchange now became more meaningful and negotiations began again in November of 1399.

In a letter written during that month, Martin responded to a letter from Abu-Faris (Abu-l-'Abbas' son and successor) asking for peace between Tunis, Aragon, and Sicily.²⁰ According to the letter, Martin stated that he would comply with the request by Tunis for Ambassador Queralt and would send him to negotiate the peace. He further accepted Abu-Faris' offer of a hostage and promised to give good treatment to this hostage who was identified as a first cousin to the king by the name of Ibrahim. In fact, it now seems apparent from later documents that this hostage probably arrived in late April or early May of 1400 in the company of a Jewish physician sent as a messenger from Tunis.²¹ Pere de Queralt was summoned to the court that same day for 'some affairs of no small urgency'.²² The next reference to the matter occurred in September 1401 when the hostage was described in a document as 'that Moorish captive who is in our minor palace in Barcelona and for exchange of which said king intends to give us the said bishop ...'²³ A subsequent reference was made to him in July of 1402 when the king ordered Queralt to trade the captive moor 'Mule Brahi, relative of the King of Tunis, for the bishop of Sicily.'²⁴ At the end of that month the 'Moorish captive named Mule Brahi' was turned over to Casasaia who had been ordered to accompany Queralt on his mission to Tunis.²⁵ As it would be difficult to interpret the name of

Mule Brahi as anything other than Ibrahim, plus the fact that two documents mention that this person was a relative of Abu-Faris, one is led to the inescapable conclusion that the hostage who was promised 'good treatment' by Martin was imprisoned and held as a political pawn. The apparently premeditated nature of the act is a startling commentary on Martin as a political pragmatist and on the situation in which he found himself.

During the year 1401 internal problems kept Martin occupied and away from the capital for the entire year. The problem of the peace treaty and of the prisoners in Tunis seemed to fall into abeyance. As the papal license for the armada expired early in that year, Martin seems to have been left with diplomatic negotiation as the sole weapon in his arsenal.

It was not until February of 1402 that Queralt was ordered once again to report to Martin in order to begin his mission. That month Martin wrote to the Master of the Mercedarians asking for 1000 gold florins of Aragon from the funds collected for the purpose of ransoming captives.²⁶ The letter that appears in the registers under the seal of secrecy (where most of this correspondence is copied) do not reveal whether this sum had actually been requested by Tunis. In April 1402 new instructions were prepared for Queralt.²⁷ They are very similar to the instructions prepared four years previously in April of 1398 with the addition of a request for relics of St. Oliva and of Christ.

The final stages of preparation for the mission of peace and prisoner exchange began in the summer of 1402. In July of that year, Martin instructed Queralt that if he was unable to secure the freedom of all the captives he ought to try for certain individuals, especially the bishop of Syracuse.²⁸ A few days later Martin arranges for 1000 florins to be deposited in the bishop's name in Barcelona.²⁹ The instructions state that if the bishop were freed the money was to be paid to Martin; if not, the money was to be returned to whomever deposited it. In August, Martin wrote again to the Master General of the Mercedarians informing him that the request for the 1000 florins be brought up at the next general chapter of the order being held on 16 August.³⁰ From this, it seems obvious that it was not the Mercedarian order that had provided the money deposited in the Barcelona bank. On 7 August, Martin wrote Queralt asking him to work diligently to secure the relics of St. Oliva and Christ but, that if all that he is being sent to bargain for could not be obtained, he was to settle for what he could get. Also, Martin requested that Queralt procure some marble columns and high quality stone work made in Tunis.³¹ Need it be stressed

that all of this time the prisoners have been languishing in what appears to have been appalling conditions of imprisonment.

Queralt finally began his mission in 1402 – more than years after its inception. The course of the negotiations that took place in Tunis spanned the period August/September 1402 to March 1403. The actual treaty seems to have been signed some time in March 1403 and is referred to as concluded in a document issued by the city of Marseilles on 22 March 1403.³² A document emanating from Mallorca dated 19 March 1403 indicated that subjects of Tunis, Bougie, Bone, and Constantine, were not to be harmed in any manner, although they seem to be differentiated from those described generally as being at peace with the kingdom.³³ A second document, also from the governor of Mallorca, dated 21 March 1403 refers to the negotiations and, as a gesture of friendship, returns to Tunis a prisoner from that kingdom who had been captured in a raid in the territorial waters of Tlemsen.³⁴ In May of that year, the governor of Mallorca seems to make official reference to the treaty in a proclamation to officials of the crown of Aragon that states: 'conditions exist that make for peace and truce with said beneficent king and under protection and safe-conduct to the lord king of Tunis...'³⁵ On 27 June, Roger received the order to publicise this treaty, along with a copy of the document in Latin. In order that 'no one be able to allege ignorance of said peace' Roger ordered it translated (*arromansar*). This explanation precedes the text of the treaty which was finally published on 6 September 1403.³⁶

In the treaty of 1403, the articles dealing with the question of the captives number 12 of 51 chapters. These sections spell out in very particular detail the rather considerable amounts of money to be paid to free the captives. Although this in itself was not the normal procedure in peace treaties, it does follow the precedent set by the Genoese-Tunisian treaty of 1391. The stipulations dealing with the prisoners detail the circumstances under which captive infants are considered freeborn; the price for children under captivity; permission for captives while awaiting ransoming to pay a weekly bond in order to be allowed out of irons; and a number of other details of lesser interest. All these articles are unique and are clues to the fact that relations between the two realms had undergone considerable permutations from the relatively cordial negotiations conducted previously.

A further sign of the peculiar nature of this treaty is that the first article deals with the possibility of future conflict between the crowns of Aragon, Sicily, and Tunis. According to this first section, hostilities between Sicily and Tunis over the islands of

Djerba (claimed by Sicily) and Pantaneleya (claimed by Tunis), were not to be engaged in for a period of at least five years and then only after a declaration of intent to attack was given six months prior to the assault. Because of political exigencies affecting the crown of Aragon, this short-term suspension of hostilities over these two areas of contention outlasted the expiration date of 1408 and, in fact, endured for 30 years – until Alfons el Lliberal led an attack on Djerba in 1432. The fact, however, that this problem was dealt with first in the treaty would seem to indicate that it was an important consideration, possibly an urgent one, at the time the treaty was signed.

In the period immediately following the signing of the peace, the documents indicate that Martín was attempting to honor the treaty of 1403. He seems to have made serious efforts to return Tunisian captives to Tunis, as indicated by two documents.³⁷ This scrupulosity is noteworthy in view of the fact that the crown of Aragon had been forced to pay a heavy ransom for the return of its own subjects from Tunis. However, by 1406 war was being considered by Martín's son, the king of Sicily, as he wrote to his father in January explaining why he was unable to obey a command to send an envoy to Tunis to try to negotiate for restitution of damages caused to citizens of Sicily since the signing of the peace.³⁸ In this letter, Martín el Giovane informs his father that he is making preparations for war in the likelihood that no restitution would be made. The preparations he describes were extensive and certainly seem to indicate a commitment to war on the part of Martín el Giovane. On the other hand, Martín had obviously not given up in his attempts to honor the treaty. In February of that same year, he received a report informing him that Pere de Queralt was on his way to Tunis to bring back the captives taken during peace time or to free them.³⁹

It seems likely that Martín kept the peace and kept his son in line until the five year limit expired sometime around March 1408. By 1409, however, it was apparent that Martín el Giovane had embarked on a campaign against Tunisian subjects. The evidence for this is to be found in documents dated 10 May 1409, in which Martín el Giovane details the conditions for a 'truce' between Sicily and Tunis.⁴⁰ According to the letters, two Jewish emissaries from Trapani had become involved as go-betweens in attempting to settle hostilities between Sicily and Tunis. Martín el Giovane informed them that although he could not enter peace negotiations with Tunis without the participation of his father, he would be willing to consider a 'truce' between Tunis and Sicily if Tunis

consented to pay 30,000 doubloons for the ransom of captive Moors being held at that time in Sicily. This would seem to indicate that Martin el Giovane had begun operations against Tunisian shipping and had captured considerable numbers of people. Although the letter reads like a blackmail document, it is certainly in line with the conditions imposed on the crown of Aragon in the treaty of 1403. The large sum involved may even represent the amount that the crown was forced to pay to redeem its own citizens from captivity.

This new, and final, phase of diplomacy between Martin, his son, and Abu-Faris came to an abrupt end when Martin el Giovane died on 25 July 1409 and was followed by his father less than a year later on 31 May 1410. The death of Martin threw the crown of Aragon into a period of turmoil during an extended interregency, followed by the short reign of Ferran.⁴¹ Although the crown was stabilized during the rule of Alfons el Lliberal, relations between the crown of Aragon and Tunis remained as hostile as they had become during the rule of Martin.⁴²

NOTES:

¹ For Antonio de Capmany y de Montpalau, see *Memorias historicas sobre la marina, comercio y artes de la antigua ciudad de Barcelona*, 5 vols., (Madrid: 1779) and *Antiguos tratados de paces y alianzas entre algunos reyes de Aragon y diferentes principes infieles de Asia y Africa, desde el siglo xiii hasta el xv*, (Madrid: 1786). For Jacques M.J.L. de Mas Latrie see *Relations et commerce de L'Afrique Septentrionale ou Magreb avec les nations Chrétiennes au Moyen Age* (Paris: 1886) and *Traité de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des Chrétiens avec les arabes de L'Afrique Septentrionale au Moyen Age*, (Paris, 1866). For Andres Gimenez Soler see 'Documentos de Tunéz, originales o traducidos, del Archivo de la Corona de Aragon, *Anuari del Institut d'Estudis Catalans*, (Barcelona: 1909-1910), 210-262 and 'Episodios de la historia de las relaciones entre la Corona de Aragon y Tunéz', *Anuari* (1907), 195-224. For Robert Brunschvig see *La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafides: des origines a la fin du xv^e siècle*, 2 vols., (Paris: 1940; 1947) and 'Documents inédits sur les relations entre la Couronne d'Aragon et la Berbérie orientale au xiv^e siècle', *Annales de l'Institut d'Etudes Orientales*, vol. II (1936), 235-265. For Charles-Emmanuel Dufourcq see *L'Espagne Catalane et Le Maghrib aux xiii^e et xiv^e siècles*,

(Paris: 1966) and 'La Couronne d'Aragon et les Hafides ou xiii siècle (1229-1301), 51-113; 255-292; 'Documents inédits sur la politique ifrikyenne de la Couronne d'Aragon', 255-292; 'Nouveaux documents sur la politique africaine de la Couronne d'Aragon', 29-32 all to be found in *Analecta sacra Tarraconensia*, (Barcelona: 1952; 1953). For additional published documents emanating from the kings of Tunis, reflecting the Tunisian side of the correspondence, see M.A. Alarcon y Santon and Ramon Garcia de Linares, *Los documentos arabes diplomaticos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragon*, (Madrid: 1940).

² C.E. Dufourcq, 'La Couronne d'Aragon', *Analecta sacra Tarraconensia*, xxv (1952), 51.

³ For treaty of Panissars (1285) see A. de Capmany de Montpalau, y *Antiguos tratados*, 39-52. For treaty of 1360 see M.A. Alarcon, *Los documentos arabes*, 311-320.

⁴ An examination of Abu-l-'Abbas' reign appears in R. Brunschvig, *La Berbérie orientale*, I, 187-209.

⁵ In order to avoid confusion for the English language reader I will henceforth use the English spelling for Marti's name.

⁶ For a detailed account of the siege of Mahdia see E. Marengo, *Genova e Tunisi, 1388-1515: Relazione Storica*, (Rome: 1901), 25-28; John Froisart, *Chronicles of England, France, Spain and the Adjoining Countries*, 2 vols., translated by Thomas Johnes, (London: 1842), 446-449; 465; Brunschvig's treatment of the siege and subsequent negotiations can be found on pages 199-203 of his *La Berbérie orientale*, vol. I.

⁷ After the treaty of 1307 the ambassador from the crown of Aragon is instructed to secure the freedom of Christian captives, without ransom, in accord with the treaty. See Capmany, *Antiguos Tratados*, 58. In 1325 a request for freedom of a captive, with no reference to ransom, is predicated on the existence of a treaty in effect between the crowns. Capmany, *Memorias*, I, 83. The peace treaty of 1360 specifies that subjects of Tunis 'seran puestos en libertad quantos se hallaren en cautiverio' after the signing of the treaty. Alarcon, *Los documentos arabes*, 318. A treaty signed in 1377 between the crowns of Aragon and Granada specifies that the two kingdoms will exchange all prisoners, without reference to ransom payment. Alarcon, *Los documentos arabes*, 412-13.

⁸ A detailed account of the attack on Torreblanca can be found in Andreu Ivars Cardona, O.F.M., *Dos creuades Valenciano-Malloquinès a les costes de Berbéria: 1397-1399*, (Valencia: 1921). For a discussion of the Tunisian attack on Gozo in 1389 see Brunschvig, *La Berbérie orientale*, I, 197-198 and 205 where he refers to Abu-l-'Abbas' description of the attack on Gozo as an episode of the 'holy war' he was conducting against the Christians. For references to Sicilian captives see Brunschvig, *La Berbérie orientale*, I, 206 in which he cites documents dated 25 February 1393 whereby Martin, at that point in time Duke of Montblanch, instructs his ambassador to Tunis to demand the liberation of the Sicilian captives. Also see document published in R. Starrabba, 'Documenti riguardanti la Sicilia sotto re Martino I', *Archivio Storico Siciliano*, iii (1875), 172,

dated in the 8th indiction (1400) in which Martin, writing to his son the king of Sicily, refers to the news sent from Sicily 'that the king of Tunis wages war against Sicily and every year continually, with six galleys, injures said realm taking people and turning people away from said realm and had taken Terranova and in this way how some coastal towns are in danger, especially those with few people.' Martin's reply is that he is sending Queralt to negotiate the peace and free the prisoners.

⁹ Archivo Historico de la Corona de Aragon (A.H.A.), Cartes reals Joan I, caja 7, num. 1058 and 1065. For a published transcription of document 1058 (the letter from the prisoners of Gozo) see Johannes Vincke, *Die gesandtschaften de Konige Aragon um die Reliquien hl. Barbara*, (1940), 121. This transcription is incorrectly dated 1408 by Vincke. It is apparent that he dated it by indiction without noting that it was, in fact, addressed to Martin as Duke of Montblanch. For that reason it must be dated an entire indiction series earlier, namely 1393.

¹⁰ A.H.A., R. 2240, f. 72r. (23 March 1398). For published transcription see D. Girona y Llagostera, 'Itinerari del rey en Marti (1396-1410)' *Extret de l'Anuari de l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans*, (Barcelona: 1916), 33-34.

¹¹ Geronimo Zurita, *Anales de la Corona de Aragon*, vol. ii, (Zaragoza: 1668), 425.

¹² A.H.A., R. 2239, f. 122v. (27 February 1398); Girona, 32.

¹³ A.H.A., Cartes reals Martin I, caja 1, num. 104: 'Don Martin ... a todos e quales quiere oficiales e sotsmesos nostros dentro el Regno daragon... havemos sabido huy dada de la present yassia el estol desta santa armada ... sia ya partida dela playa o grau dela dita ciudad entanto que ha fustas do mas gentes pudiessen ir encara que quisiessen e lo que peor yes muyta gent qui daqueste Regno apres quel dito estol yes partido yes ida ala dita Ciudad ... vos dezimos e mandamos ... que encontiment vistas las presentes con voz de publica crida publicar sagades ... que alguno de quales condition o stamento sia no sia osado yr en la dita amade dius pena de perder el cuerpo e el honor la qual pena queremos e vos mandamos en el no obedient sia executada ... como el contrario seria muyt perigloso a los moros de nostra senyoria.'

¹⁴ For Brunschvig's discussion of this question see *La Berbérie*, I, 220-221.

¹⁵ A.H.A., R. 2240, f. 136v and R. 2240, f. 137r. (28 September 1398); Girona, 45.

¹⁶ A.H.A., R. 2240, f. 167r-v. (12 January 1399); see Girona, 55.

¹⁷ A.H.A., R. 2242, f. 117 (6 May 1399); see Girona, 63.

¹⁸ A.H.A., R. 2242, f. 161. (11 August 1399); see Ivars, 140. See Ivars, 144 for document on this question dated 26 August 1399.

¹⁹ A.H.A., R. 2242, f. 186r-v. (17 November 1399); see Ivars, 159-160.

²¹ A.H.A., R. 2243, f. 99r. (3 May 1400). The first letter in question merely informs the *batlle* of Barcelona that 'maester Boniuha Bondavi jeheu fisich sa a nos vengut per misatger del rey de Tunij...' It goes on to ask that they be issued a garment described as follows: 'portare la roda groga e verenella segons nouellament es stat ordonat.' Since this

letter is immediately followed by one addressed to Pere Queralt which states: 'Com nos vos haiam per alguns afferis no poch urgents molt necessari pregam e manam vos tan expresament com podem que tantost per stats e vinguts a nos ...' I conclude that the ship from Tunis is likely to have brought the hostage, along with the physician and the two others mentioned to serve as messengers.

²² See the second document quoted in note 21.

²³ A.H.A., R. 2244, f. 77v. (28 September 1401): 'Lo Rey. En Casasaye. Nos sobre la missatgeria que lonch temps ha segons nos sabers havem deliberat fets per lo noble mossen P. de Queralt al Rey de Tunij per lo recobrament del bisbe de Saragoça com daltres presos ... E fets tenir esment quel moro catiu lo qual es al palau menor nostre en Barchinona e per cambi del qual lo dit Rey nos enten donar lo dit bisbe ...'

²⁴ A.H.A., R. 2245, f. 14v. (22 July 1402); see Ivars, 162. Note, however, that Ivars mistranscribes the name of the captive as 'Male Brachc'.

²⁵ A.H.A., R. 2245, 17r. (31 July 1402). 'Lo Rey. — Segons haver sabut per relatio del feel Cambier nostre en F. de sentmanat donzell vos havets liurat al feel conselli nostro en ffrancesus de casasaia mercaderde barchinona aquell more catiu apellat Mule brahi ... — Dirigitur Nicholo capita guardiano Regii palacii minoris.' Casasaia is given specific instructions about his particular role in the negotiations in a document dated 7 August 1402 (A.H.A., R. 2245, f. 19r).

²⁶ A.H.A., R. 2244, f. 134v. (25 February 1402); see Girona, 95.

²⁷ A.H.A., R. 2244, f. 156v-157v. (12 April 1402); see Ivars, 161.

²⁸ A.H.A., R. 2245, f. 14v. (22 July 1402); see Ivars, 162.

²⁹ A.H.A., R. 2245, f. 15r. (22 July 1402). 'Lo Rey. — En Casasaia ... per la deliverata del dit bisbe se pague mil florins darago volem que facats que aquella sien depositat en la taula dela Cuitat de barchinona sots tal condicio que si per qualsevol dels caps demunt dits lo dit bisbe sera deliverat de sa captivitat los dits mil florins seran liurats a nos o aqui nos manarem e si per ventura no podra esser delivrat lo dit bisbe peguts... aquella persona que per nom del dit bisbe les haura depositats.'

³⁰ A.H.A., R. 2245, f. 18. (3 August 1402); see Girona, 101.

³¹ A.S.A., R. 2245, f. 19. (7 August 1402); see Girona, 101.

³² R. Brunschvig, *La Berberie*, I, 225.

³³ Archivo Historico de Mallorca (A.H.M.), A.H. 82, f. 80: 'Guidaticum fferari peyre patroni cuisdam galiote xxii bancharum. Nos en Roger de Moncada baron... no harats dampnificats alguns sotsmeses del dit senyou ne altres qui sien en pau e en treua ab aquell ne sotsmesses del rey de Tunis de bogia de bona e de contestina ...'

³⁴ A.H.M., A.H. 82, f. 86: 'Molt alt e poderos princeps mule bufferes [Abu-Faris] Rey de Tunis. En Roger de Moncada ... patro de Galiota es arribat en questa ciutat ab la sua Galiota ... aportats aci algunos moros presos e cativats segons havem trobat ab informatio legitima en les mars de benigener del Realme de Tremse e ab los dits moros es stat preso abdalla benegamet altamin orlo qual haven trobat esser del vostre Royalme de Tunij e nos molt alt princep volents tenir e servar la bona confianca e

amistat ques serve entes lo dit Rey e senyor nostre ... e vos ... segons es stat trattat per lo molt noble mossen P. de guralt encents que vos e vostros sotsmeses trattats amigablement abs los sots meses del dit senyor Rey nostre havem deslineat a guitiament soltat de mans del dit parto ... lo dit abdalla benehamet ...'

³⁵ A.H.M., A.H. 82, f. 88. (30 May 1403): 'Honorabilibus universis et singulis officialibus et personis venerabilis intra dominationem illustrissime domini Aragon Regis ... de Rogerius de Montecatenno ... no dampnificando in personis vel bonis aliquos subditos domini Regis predicti vel de ditione sua nec aliquos alios cuiusquis status legis vel conditionis existant qui sint in pace vel treuga cum dicto denigno Rege aut sub protectione et salva guardia dicto domini regis de Tuniç ...'

³⁶ A.H.M., A.H. 421, f. 123r-134v; see E. Aguilo, 'Pau feta entre els reys de Arago y de Sicilia de una part y el rey de Tunis de l'altre (1403)', *Bulleti Societat Luliana*, ix (1901-02), 350-355.

³⁷ A.H.A., R. 2248, f. 35v. (20 September 1403): 'Lo Rey. — Mossen Guillem ... Sapiats que nos havem mester un sclau negre per servir aci en la nostre cambra, e segons havem entes vos tenits I daquells qui foren presos de Tuniç a Oriola, lo qual sclau nos trametats decontinent.' In addition, A.H.A., R. 2245, f. 184v. (27 September 1403) in Girona, 101 in which Martin requests full details from Queralt in order to decide whether to return two Tunisian captives who had been taken after having left Tunis without permission 'e enaven en altres parts per amnar fustes contra nostres vassalls e sotsmeses ...' In spite of this incriminating activity on the part of the captives Martin was most anxious to investigate the problem carefully in order not to take a chance on violating the peace.

³⁸ A.H.A., Cartes Reales Martin I, caja 5, num. 882. (5 January 1406): 'Molt alt e molt excellent princep ... que vostra gratia senyoria vol a ordona que yo tramates al rey de Tuniç per requerir lo que faes restituir e tomar les dans per sos sotsmeses donats a sotsmeses vostres senyou e meus del temps enca que son fermada la pau ... e com molt alt senyou segons lo so deles paraules del dit capitol se dega rahanablement [one word indecipherable] que sia comminacio de fer lo semblant que ell ha fer e per consequent seria guerra ... yo aci he fet ja faç e fare aquell millar preparatori que puxa axi de galeas e gents dames com altres coses necessaries ... he ordonat e faç fer en diverses parts daquesta ylla per les maritimes algunes torres per guarda daquella per les quals se pora saber en un jom per tota la ylla si fustes algunes hic haura arribades ... vostre humil primogenit qui besa vostres mans ... lo Rey de Sicilia ...'

³⁹ A.H.A., Cartes Reales Martin I, caja 5, 910. (11 February 1406): 'Molt alt senor ... Guillem de Fenollet ... Item molt alt senyor conta com mossen P. de Aueralt ab la galera den bemes devia anar per embaxador al Rey de tunis per traure los catius preses en pau o dadi deseximents.'

⁴⁰ These three documents from the Archivio di Stato of Palermo are published in Mas Latrie, *Traités de paix*, (Documents), 167-169.

⁴¹ In 1416 a letter is sent to Ferran from the prisoners in Tunis in which they state that: 'nosalters mesquins estant confians que apres vostre

coronacio nosalters aurem reemsio dels penes en que som posats e per co molt alt senyor nosalters mesquins catius crestains ... qui fore aci en poder dels infels ... More than likely this confidence, on their part, was misplaced.

⁴² For an account of the course of these later relations see R. Brunschvig, *La Berberie*, I, 225ff. Zurita's graphic narrative describing Alfons' attack on Djerba can be found in his Libro xiv, on pages 210-211 of the fourth volume of the edition cited above. Mas Latrie publishes a number of documents which were sent between the crowns of Aragon (including Sicily) and Tunis during the period after 1438. See his *Traités de paix*, (Documents), 169-181; 330-341.